As the Creditor of the United States of America and "All" Debtor Nations.. it is THE Duly Constituted CREDITOR'S respon

[jose v]

When the dust settles; Remember: This DEBT OWED TO Durham Holding Trust, Tias 12087 is due and payable, per contract in :American Gold Dollars, Gold Bullion, Gold Coin and/or Coin of the Realm."

This TRUST holds that Collateral for the Benefit of WE, the People to protect them against Corruption and Organized Crime.

Keep in mind; We are not the Criminal's.. BUT! 10 TO 01.. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SMART ENOUGH TO FIGURE OUT WHO THE CRIMINALS ARE!

However Be that as it may: As the Creditor of the United States of America and "All" Debtor Nations.. it is THE Duly Constituted CREDITOR'S responsibility to inform interested parties of Durham Trust being in full Compliance with those provisions of Law as Cited in United States of America's Title Codes and U.S. Statutes at Large, Plus Brown and Little's provisions as cited in 1 U.S.C. Sec. 113
1 USC 113 - Sec. 113. 'Little and Brown's' edition of laws and treaties; slip laws; Treaties and Other International Acts Series; admissibility in evidence

and 1 USC 114 - Sec. 114. Sealing of instruments etc:

Chapter 2 - Acts and Resolutions; Formalities of Enactment; Repeals; Sealing of Instruments
1 USC 107 - Sec. 107. Parchment or paper for printing enrolled bills or resolutions

1 USC 108 - Sec. 108. Repeal of repealing act

1 USC 109 - Sec. 109. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities

1 USC 110 - Sec. 110. Saving clause of Revised Statutes

1 USC 111 - Sec. 111. Repeals as evidence of prior effectiveness

1 USC 112 - Sec. 112. Statutes at Large; contents; admissibility in evidence

1 USC 112 - Sec. 112a. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements; contents; admissibility in evidence

1 USC 112 - Sec. 112b. United States international agreements; transmission to Congress

1 USC 113 - Sec. 113. 'Little and Brown's' edition of laws and treaties; slip laws; Treaties and Other International Acts Series; admissibility in evidence

1 USC 114 - Sec. 114. Sealing of instruments

It is impossible for this TRUST do do that which must ultimately be done to protect the People with these Counterfeit GAIA-Ekkers "Deeds of Assignments" still floating around.. which will continue for terms up to and including 35 years from 1997-98 such as these, which were intended to

"take the global banking, financing and economics hostage, and only VK Durham would know the truth." [end quote] when these insruments and over $107 Quantillion Dollars which were lodged in the Far East Gold Banks.. Once lodged the ware house receipts were tendered by the banks.. Gold was purchased with those "warehouse receipts".. Once the "term of the contracts expired" the Gold Banks attempted to collect from the "contract aka Deed of Assignments" for which the GAIA-Ekkers had already collected "50% in Gold or equivilant".. as the Dept of the Treasury and Fed. R. split the 50% which had been gathering in "Off Shore Accounts." See: http://www.theantechamber.net/VkDocuments/DocGroupG/Gpage4.html .
There is going to be an attempt.. to CANCEL those DEBTS which were written by the Global Alliance Investment Association aka GAIA by the name of E.J. and Doris J. Ekker.. which you can read their Deeds of Assignment at PLEASE OPEN THESE UP AND SEE WHO ISSUED THE "DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT" this WHISTLEBLOWER IS BLACK-GUARDING, USING YELLOW JOURNALISM TO DEFAME "DURHAM HOLDING TRUST, TIAS 12087" for the Criminal Acts of Others.. OPEN these UP; YOU BE THE JUDGE... U.S. DEBT INSTRUMENTS such DR. DEKU of GHANA which can be found at
http://www.theantechamber.net/VkDocuments/deku/deku31.htm
and another at http://www.theantechamber.net/VkDocuments/DocGroupL/Lpage1.html .

Even the WORLD COLLATERAL HOUSE i.e. BANK got taken in.. the CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY document can be read at
http://www.theantechamber.net/VkDocuments/DocGroupI/GroupIindex.html .

The GAIA-EKKER'S or COMMANDER HATONN and etc has put out they make no bones about President G.H.W. Bush, President George W. Bush, and GOVERNOR JEB BUSH assisting them in this "U.S. DEBT INSTRUMENT OPERATION" and that can be read at
http://www.theantechamber.net/Contact/Contact11205/ContactIndex.htm ..

As stated: They are going to attempt to CANCEL the DEBT based on those instruments.. But, it has been long standing opinions of the American Judiciary and additional legal opinions; The Constitution of 1862 was invoked by Peru for the Presidential Power to enter into this "One Time Only Commodity Contract." While the Constitution of the United States was invoked "To Assume the Latin American Debt."

However, This Trust has retained it's Rights involving those certain Rights in accordance to 1. U.S.C. Sec. 113
under 1 U.S.C. Sec. 111 "1 U.S.C. § 111 Sec. 111. Repeals as evidence of prior effectiveness .
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_Banking_Act

While, yet the American Judiciary in Gold Clause Cases: Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) Argued on Jan. 10, 11, 1935. Decided on Feb. 18, 1935.

Plaintiff brought suit as the owner of an obligation of the United States for $10,000. Plaintiff alleged in his petition that at the time the bond was issued, and when he acquired it, 'a dollar in gold.' [These were Liberty Bonds]

snip: First. The Import of the Obligation. The bond in suit differs from an obligation of private parties, or of states or municipalities, whose contracts are necessarily made in subjection to the dominant power of the Congress. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407, decided this day. The bond now before us is an obligation of the United States. The terms of the bond are explicit. They were not only expressed in the bond itself, but they were definitely prescribed by the Congress. The Act of September 24, 1917, both in its original and amended form, authorized the moneys to be borrowed, and the bonds to be issued, 'on the credit of the United States,' in order to meet expenditures needed 'for the national security and defense and other public purposes authorized by law.' Section 1, 40 Stat. 288, as amended by Act April 4, 1918, 1, 40 Stat. 503, 31 USCA 752. The circular of the Treasury Department of September 28, 1918, to which the bond refers 'for a statement of the further rights of the holders of bonds of said series,' also provided that the principal and interest 'are payable in United States gold coin of the present standard of value.'

snip: The government states in its brief that the total unmatured interest- bearing obligations of the United States outstanding on May 31, 1933 ( which it is understood contained a 'gold clause' substantially the same as that of the bond in suit), amounted to about twenty-one billions of dollars. From statements at the bar, it appears that this amount has been reduced to approximately twelve billions at the present time, and that during the intervening period the public debt of the United States has risen some seven billions (making a total of approximately twenty-eight billions five hundred millions) by the issue of some sixteen billions five hundred millions of dollars 'of non-gold-clause obligations.'

snip:
Second. The Binding Quality of the Obligation. The question is necessarily presented whether the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. 113 (31 USCA 462, 463), is a valid enactment so far as it applies to the obligations of the United States. The resolution declared that provisions requiring 'payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency' were 'against public policy,' and provided that 'every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein,' shall be discharged 'upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.' This enactment was expressly extended to obligations of the United States and provisions for payment in gold, 'contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States,' were repealed. 1 Section 1(a), 31 USCA 463(a). [p*350] There is no question as to the power of the Congress to regulate the value of money: that is, to establish a monetary system and thus to determine the currency of the country. The question is whether the Congress can use that power so as to invalidate the terms of the obligations which the government has theretofore issued in the exercise of the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. In attempted justification of the Joint Resolution in relation to the outstanding bonds of the United States, the government argues that 'earlier Congresses could not validly restrict the 73rd Congress from exercising its constitutional powers to regulate the value of money, borrow money, or regulate foreign and interstate commerce'; and, from this premise, the government seems to deduce the proposition that when, with adequate authority, the government borrows money and pledges the credit of the United States, it is free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient. The government's contention thus raises a question of far greater importance than the particular claim of the plaintiff. On that reasoning, if the terms of the government's bond as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated. The contention necessarily imports that the Congress can disregard the obligations of the government at its discretion, and that, when the government borrows money, the credit of the United States is an illusory pledge.

We do not so read the Constitution. There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority [p*351] and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money under the authority which the Constitution confers. In authorizing the Congress to borrow money, the Constitution empowers the Congress to fix the amount to be borrowed and the terms of payment. By virtue of the power to borrow money 'on the credit of the United States,' the Congress is authorized to pledge that credit as an assurance of payment as stipulated, as the highest assurance the government can give, its plighted faith. To say that the Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise; a pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This Court has given no sanction to such a conception of the obligations of our government.

The binding quality of the obligations of the government was considered in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718, 719 S.. The question before the Court in those cases was whether certain action was warranted by a reservation to the Congress of the right to amend the charter of a railroad company. While the particular action was sustained under this right of amendment, the Court took occasion to state emphatically the obligatory character of the contracts of the United States. The Court said: 'The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen.' 2 [p*352] When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference, said the Court in United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377, 392, except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent. See, also, The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 675; Cooke v. United States, 91 US. 389, 396. In Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580, 54 S.Ct. 840, 844, with respect to an attempted abrogation by the Act of March 20, 1933, 17, 48 Stat. 8, 11 (38 USCA 717), of certain outstanding war risk insurance policies, which were contracts of the United States, the Court quoted with approval the statement in the Sinking Fund Cases, supra, and said: 'Punctilious fulfillment of contractual obligations is essential to the maintenance of the credit of public as well as private debtors. No doubt there was in March, 1933, great need of economy. In the administration of all government business economy had become urgent because of lessened revenues and the heavy obligations to be issued in the hope of relieving widespread distress. Congress was free to reduce gratuities deemed excessive. But Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would [p*353] be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation.'

The argument in favor of the Joint Resolution, as applied to government bonds, is in substance that the government cannot by contract restrict the exercise of a sovereign power. But the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty. 3 In the United States, sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs established by the Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 93; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064. The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared. The powers conferred upon the Congress are harmonious. The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, an unqualified power, a power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged. Having this power to authorize the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obli- [p*354] gations. The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists, and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign. Lynch v. United States, supra, pages 580, 582, of 292 U.S. 54 S.Ct. 840. http://newdeal.feri.org/court/294US330.htm

1 USC 111 - Sec. 111. Repeals as evidence of prior effectiveness




WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WAKE UP-2008